On August 13, 1941, in the midst of the London blitz, C.S. Lewis delivered his second BBC talk, which he called "Scientific Law and Moral Law. Later, when those talks were published as "Broadcast Talks" in England, and as "The Case for Christianity" in America, it became Chapter 3 with the same name, but when it was republished as "Mere Christianity" in 1952, the name of this chapter was renamed, "The Reality of the Law."
Lewis begins by recalling the first chapter, that though people thought they behave a certain way - fair play, morality, or some other name, they in fact did not not. Lewis points out this state of affairs has certain consequences.
Inanimate objects, like trees and rocks, observe the laws of nature, but not by choice. In stark contrast, humans choose whether or not to follow the moral law, the law of human nature. Thus, while the law of nature simply describes how rocks and trees behave in nature, the Law of Human Nature tells human beings what they ought to do or not do. While the law of nature simply describes the facts with regard to the rocks and trees, the Law of Human Nature deals with something above and beyond the facts.
Some try to explain this as simply a matter of inconvenience - that if someone behaves in a manner
you think he ought not, this simply means it's inconvenient to you. Lewis objects. If a man takes a seat you want on a train because he got there first - you don't object. However, if a man slips into the same seat while my back was momentarily turned, and removed the bag I placed there - I strongly object. Both cases involve inconvenience to me, but the first man I do not blame while the second man I blame. There are other examples whether the behavior of others might be very convenient to me, yet I still recognize their behavior is quite wrong, such as a traitor during war.
Others say what we call the moral law simply amounts to what's best for the entire society instead of the individual. Though Lewis agrees in part, he argues this misses the point - it's circular. The argument basically says you ought to do what is right because it's right. It simply doesn't go any further. Lewis compares this to saying you ought to play soccer in order to score goals. However, scoring goals is the whole point of soccer - it's not the reason for the game. By saying this - Lewis says you are basically saying you should play soccer to play soccer - something not worth saying. Same as if you said you should behave decently in order to behave decently. Circular.
We have a basic sense, derived from somewhere other than just nature, that we ought to behave a certain way, and we cannot get rid of that notion. It must be a real thing - not something we made up. It's not simply a fact - not simply our behavior - since we know we ourselves do not follow this standard of behavior. Lewis points to a real law, pressing in upon us, which we did not make up.
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